In Re Paoli Railroad v. by unknown
1997 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-12-1997 
In Re Paoli Railroad v. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re Paoli Railroad v." (1997). 1997 Decisions. 101. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/101 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed May 12, 1997 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




IN RE: PAOLI RAILROAD YARD PCB LITIGATION 
 





SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); NATIONAL RAILROAD 
PASSENGER CORPORATION ("AMTRAK"); AND 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ROY F. WESTON, INC.; 
and OH MATERIALS COMPANY; and GENERAL ELECTRIC 
COMPANY; and THE BUDD COMPANY; and 
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION; and 
MONSANTO CO.; PENN CENTRAL CORPORATION 
(D.C. Civil No. 86-cv-02229) 
 
GEORGE ALBERT BURRELL; and PRISCILLA ETHERIDGE 
BURRELL, in their own right, and GEORGE ALBERT 
BURRELL and PRISCILLA ETHERIDGE BURRELL, as 
parents and natural guardian of AMBER SHARDAI 
BURRELL, a minor, and GEORGE ALBERT BURRELL, as 
parent and natural guardian of ANDRE WALKER, a 
minor, and PRISCILLA ETHERIDGE BURRELL, as parent 
and natural guardian of BOBBY GEORGE ALBERT 





SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); and NATIONAL RAILROAD 
PASSENGER CORPORATION ("AMTRAK") and 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; MONSANTO COMPANY; 
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; THE BUDD COMPANY; 




PENN CENTRAL CORPORATION 
(D.C. Civil No. 86-cv-02235) 
 
K. LOUISE JONES, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE 
OF HARVEY N. JONES, JR., DECEASED; and K. LOUISE 
JONES, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF HARVEY N. 




SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); NATIONAL RAILROAD 
PASSENGER CORPORATION ("AMTRAK"); CONSOLIDATED 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
MONSANTO COMPANY; GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; 
THE BUDD COMPANY; and WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC 
CORPORATION; PENN CENTRAL CORPORATION 
(D.C. Civil No. 86-cv-05277) 
 









                                2 
PENN CENTRAL CORPORATION; UNITED STATES OF 




MONSANTO CO.; GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.; BUDD CO.; 
and WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP. 
(D.C. Civil No. 86-cv-05886) 
 
CHRISTOPHER S. BROWN; 




MONSANTO COMPANY; SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); NATIONAL 
RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION; CONSOLIDATED 




PENN CENTRAL CORPORATION; UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; GENERAL ELECTRIC 
CO.; THE BUDD COMPANY; WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC 
CORPORATION 






MONSANTO COMPANY; SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); NATIONAL 
RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION ("AMTRAK"); 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; THE BUDD COMPANY; 




PENN CENTRAL CORPORATION 
(D.C. Civil No. 86-cv-07415) 
 
                                3 




MONSANTO COMPANY; SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); NATIONAL 
RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION ("AMTRAK"); AND 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; PENN CENTRAL 
CORPORATION; and CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; GENERAL 
ELECTRIC CO.; THE BUDD CO.; and WESTINGHOUSE 
ELECTRIC CORP. 






MONSANTO COMPANY; SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); NATIONAL 
RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION ("AMTRAK"); and 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; and CITY OF 
PHILADELPHIA; THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; 





PENN CENTRAL CORPORATION 
(D.C. Civil No. 86-cv-07417) 
 




MONSANTO COMPANY; SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); NATIONAL 
RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION ("AMTRAK") and 




                                4 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; THE CITY OF 
PHILADELPHIA; and GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; 
THE BUDD COMPANY; and WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC 
CORPORATION; and PENN CENTRAL CORP. 






MONSANTO COMPANY; SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); NATIONAL 
RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION ("AMTRAK"); and 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
and GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; THE BUDD 
COMPANY; WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION 
(D.C. Civil No. 86-cv-07419) 
 




MONSANTO COMPANY; SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); NATIONAL 
RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION ("AMTRAK"); and 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
and GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; THE BUDD 
COMPANY; and WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC 
CORPORATION; and PENN CENTRAL CORPORATION 
(D.C. Civil No. 86-cv-07420) 
 
                                5 




MONSANTO COMPANY; SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); NATIONAL 
RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION ("AMTRAK"); and 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; THE BUDD COMPANY; 
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION; PENN 
CENTRAL CORPORATION 






MONSANTO COMPANY; SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY ("SETPA"); NATIONAL 
RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION ("AMTRAK"); and 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; and THE BUDD 
COMPANY; and WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY; 
PENN CENTRAL CORP. 
(D.C. Civil No. 86-cv-07422) 
 
JOHN INGRAM SR. and PATRICIA INGRAM, in their own 
right and as parents and natural guardians of JOHN 




                                6 
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); and NATIONAL RAILROAD 
PASSENGER CORPORATION ("AMTRAK"); and 
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION ("CONRAIL"); and 
MONSANTO COMPANY ("MONSANTO"); and GENERAL 





UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; THE BUDD COMPANY; 
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION; PENN 
CENTRAL CORPORATION 
(D.C. civil No. 86-cv-07561) 
 
WILLIAM BUTLER; THERESA BUTLER; MARVIN L. 
SIMPSON; ALLEN K. SIMPSON; KAREN R. SIMPSON; 




SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY ("SEPTA"); NATIONAL RAILROAD 
PASSENGER CORPORATION ("AMTRAK"); and 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
MONSANTO COMPANY; GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; 
THE BUDD COMPANY; WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC 
CORPORATION; PENN CENTRAL CORPORATION 
(D.C. Civil No. 87-cv-02874) 
 




MONSANTO COMPANY; and SOUTHEASTERN 
PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY ("SEPTA") 
and NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION 





                                7 
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; THE BUDD COMPANY; 
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION; PENN 
CENTRAL CORPORATION 
(D.C. Civil No. 87-cv-05269) 
 
Margherita Barbetta, Mabel Brown, Cathlene Brown, 
Celeste Brown, Christopher Brown, Clemmon Brown, Cloyd 
Brown, Craig Brown, Curtis Brown, William Butler, Theresa 
Butler, Bessie Cunningham, John Ingram, Sr., John 
Ingram, Jr., April Ingram Robinson-Ray, Mary Retta 
Johnson, K. Louise Jones, Karen Simpson, Alan Simpson, 
Marvin Simpson, Donald Simpson, Bryan Jackson, George 
Burrell, Priscilla Burrell, individually and as natural 




On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 
Argued: September 16, 1996 
 
Before: BECKER, NYGAARD, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed May 12, 1997) 
 
JOSEPH C. KOHN, ESQUIRE 
MARTIN J. D'URSO, ESQUIRE 
 (ARGUED) 
Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C. 
1101 Market Street, Suite 2400 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
 
ARNOLD E. COHEN, ESQUIRE 
Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, 
 Branzburg & Ellers 
1401 Walnut Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 
D. BRUCE HANES, ESQUIRE 
D. Bruce Hanes & Associates, P.C. 
1700 Market Street, Suite 2632 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
Attorneys for Appellants 
 
                                8 
ROGER F. COX, ESQUIRE 
JOHN J. MONSEES, ESQUIRE 
Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley 
1200 Four Penn Center 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 




JOHN W. VARDAMAN, ESQUIRE 
STEVEN R. KUNEY, ESQUIRE 
 (ARGUED) 
ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY, 
 ESQUIRE 
PHILIP A. SECHLER, ESQUIRE 
STEPHEN D. SENCER, ESQUIRE 
Williams & Connolly 
724 12th Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20005 
 
STEPHEN M. McMANUS, ESQUIRE 
McCormick & Priore 
30-36 South 15th Street 
Suite 1500 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 
Attorneys for Appellee - 
General Electric Company 
 
ROBERT A. SUTTON, ESQUIRE 
Deputy City Solicitor 
Office of the City Solicitor 
1600 Arch Street - 8th Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
Attorneys for Appellee - 
The City of Philadelphia 
 
                                9 
JEROME J. SHESTACK, ESQUIRE 
BARRY M. KLAYMAN, ESQUIRE 
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen 
Packard Building, 12th Floor 
S.E. Corner 15th & Chestnut Sts. 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 
Attorneys for Appellee - 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation 
 
THOMAS M. GOUTMAN, ESQUIRE 
ROBERT TOLAND, II 
White & Williams 
One Liberty Place 
1650 Market Street 
Suite 1800 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
Attorneys for Appellee - 
Monsanto Company 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This toxic tort case is before us for the third time. See In 
re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 
1990) ("Paoli I"); In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litig., 35 
F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1253 
(1995) ("Paoli II"). The plaintiffs have lived for many years in 
the vicinity of the Paoli Railroad Yard ("Yard"), a railcar 
maintenance facility at which polychlorinated biphenyls 
("PCBs") were used in profusion for over a quarter-century. 
They sued the corporations that have maintained the Yard 
and sold the PCBs, seeking to recover damages for a variety 
of physical ailments and for property damage. Plaintiffs now 
appeal from the judgment entered after an unfavorable jury 
verdict on the claims that remained for trial in the wake of 
the previous appeals. 
 
Plaintiffs present a plethora of appellate issues, several of 
which are significant enough to justify still another 
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published opinion: whether the district court abused its 
discretion in its exclusion of evidence offered by the 
plaintiffs regarding heat-degraded PCBs, and whether the 
court gave erroneous jury instructions dealing with the 
"significant exposure" element of the plaintiffs' medical 
monitoring and their property damage claims. The other 
questions presented are not of sufficient substance or 
difficulty to merit discussion here, especially given the 
length of our previous published opinions in the case,1 and 
hence we resolve them summarily.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court has also published an opinion. See In re Paoli 
Railroad Yard PCB Litig., 706 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
2. We find the following claims of the plaintiffs to be patently without 
merit: 
 
(1) the district court should have granted plaintiffs' motion seeking 
recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455; 
 
(2) the district court erred in excluding photographs of EPA 
employees wearing protective gear, evidence of remedial efforts taken 
by the railroad, an EPA report relating to the Paoli site, and an 
internal memorandum written by an EPA staff member; and 
 
(3) the district court erred in admitting the defendants' untimely 
report regarding a trend analysis of real estate values. 
 
Moreover, in Frankel v. Burke's Excavating, Inc., 397 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 
1968), we explained that, if there are jury interrogatories that make it 
clear which issues the jury found dispositive, evidentiary arguments that 
relate to other matters cannot be the cause of any prejudice to the 
plaintiff. Frankel applies here. The jury resolved the plaintiffs' medical 
monitoring claims in favor of the defendants on the threshold element of 
the claim -- whether the plaintiffs were significantly exposed to PCBs. 
Because, as the succeeding discussion demonstrates, the plaintiffs have 
not demonstrated reversible error infecting the jury's determination that 
they had not been significantly exposed to PCBs, we need not consider 
the plaintiffs' evidentiary objections that relate to other elements of their 
medical monitoring claim, including their contentions that: 
 
(1) the district court erred in excluding Dr. Barsotti's deposition 
testimony; 
 
(2) the court erred in limiting the rebuttal testimony of plaintiffs' 
expert Dr. LeWitt and in excluding the rebuttal testimony of 
plaintiffs' expert Dr. Nicholson; and 
 
(3) the district court erred in admitting charts offered by 
defendants' expert Dr. Whysner, and in excluding charts offered by 
plaintiffs' expert Dr. Nisbet. 
 
Plaintiffs also challenge the district court's decision to bifurcate the 
trial. We resolve this issue in favor of the defendants infra at n.5. 
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We resolve the remaining questions as follows: 
 
(1) We will affirm the district court's exclusion of 
evidence offered by the plaintiffs regarding heat-degraded 
PCBs. The district court correctly determined that evidence 
related to heat-degraded PCBs fell within the ambit of its 
previous order excluding evidence related to plaintiffs' 
exposure to furans under Fed. R. Evid. 403, which was 
affirmed by this Court in Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 781-82. 
Furthermore, even if heat-degraded PCBs are a chemical 
substance distinct from furans, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by excluding such evidence under Rule 
403. 
 
(2) We will affirm the district court's instructions on the 
"significant exposure" element of plaintiffs' medical 
monitoring claim. The court instructed the jury that 
plaintiffs must prove that they were exposed to PCBs at a 
level greater than that ordinarily encountered in everyday 
life. These instructions comport with this Court's 
description of the medical monitoring cause of action, the 
elements of which we explicated in Redland Soccer Club, 
Inc. v. Dept. of the Army, 55 F.3d 827 (3d. Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 772 (1996). In affirming on this point, we 
make clear that Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 771 n.36, does not 
require a different result. We did remark in the Paoli II 
footnote that, in a personal injury or medical monitoring 
action, a plaintiff may be able to survive a motion for 
summary judgment, even if he or she was not exposed to a 
greater level of PCBs than was present in the background 
area; however, when making this statement, as the footnote 
makes clear, we were contemplating the unique situation in 
which defendants expose the entire population in a 
geographic area to high levels of contaminants, so that the 
level of contaminants that the plaintiff ordinarily 
encounters is extraordinarily high as a result of the 
defendants' traceable activities. Plaintiffs adduced no such 
evidence here. 
 
(3) We will affirm the district court's instructions 
regarding the plaintiffs' property damage claims. We 
conclude that, when it instructed the jury that the property 
damage must be "actual," the district court did not 
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improperly convey that the damage need be permanent in 
order to be compensable. 
 
Because we resolve all issues in favor of the defendants, 
the judgment in their favor will be affirmed. 
 
I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The background facts are stated comprehensively in Paoli 
II. For our present purposes we make only the following 
relatively brief account. The Paoli Railroad Yard has long 
stored and handled PCBs, which are fire-resistant 
insulating fluids used in railroad car transformers. In the 
mid-1980s, the EPA documented relatively high levels of 
PCBs in the soil in the Yard and the nearby water and land. 
As a result of litigation under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 9601, et. seq., Amtrak, Conrail, and SEPTA, all 
of which owned or operated the Yard at various times since 
1976, entered into a series of consent decrees with the 
United States pursuant to which the PCB exposure in the 
Yard was monitored and controlled. In July 1992, the EPA 
issued a Record of Decision (ROD), which mandates 
extensive excavation and treatment of soils at the Yard and 
in the adjacent residential area, and erosion controls at the 
Yard.3 As of the time of oral argument, the required soil 
excavation or treatment had not been completed. 
 
The plaintiffs are individuals who have lived for many 
years in the vicinity of the Yard in areas identified by the 
EPA and by the railroad defendants' contractor as having 
experienced the most severe PCB-laden run-off. The 
plaintiffs have adduced evidence of significant levels of 
PCBs in the soil surrounding their homes, on which some 
of them played and in which some of them gardened. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The ROD calls for: (1) the excavation and treatment of residential soil 
that contains PCBs in excess of 2 ppm; (2) the erection of new erosion 
controls to further reduce water runoff from the Yard to nearby 
properties; and (3) prohibition of any future residential or agricultural 
use of the Yard. In 1992, the EPA noted that 35 residential properties 
had composite samples that exceeded 5 ppm PCBs, either in the front or 
back yards or in the garden-soil. 
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Plaintiffs also regularly traversed the Yard on foot, as they 
were given open access to the Yard prior to the mid-1980's. 
 
In 1986, thirty eight plaintiffs brought suit in the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the 
owners and operators of the Yard, and against Monsanto 
Company, the manufacturer of PCBs in the United States, 
and General Electric Company, a manufacturer of railroad- 
car transformers in which the PCBs were used. Some 
plaintiffs sought recovery for present injuries allegedly 
caused by exposure to PCBs and other assorted chemicals 
from the Yard, including polychlorinated dibenzo furans 
("furans") and polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins ("dioxins"). 
Some plaintiffs brought claims for emotional distress 
caused by fear of future injury, and for medical monitoring 
designed to decrease the chances of future illness. Finally, 
some plaintiffs brought claims for the decrease in value of 
their property caused by the presence (or reputed presence) 
of PCBs on the land. 
 
After our decision in Paoli I reversing the grant of 
summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds that 
the district court had not conducted an in limine hearing on 
evidentiary issues, plaintiffs submitted a list of expert 
witnesses, which included Melvyn Kopstein, Ph.D., who was 
proffered to testify about plaintiffs' exposure to PCBs from 
the Yard; Ian C.T. Nisbet, Ph.D., who was proffered to 
testify about plaintiffs' exposure to PCBs; and Janette 
Sherman, M.D., who was proffered to testify that PCBs had 
caused plaintiffs' injuries and that plaintiffs require medical 
monitoring to detect and treat future PCB-related illnesses. 
At the close of discovery, defendants moved in limine to 
exclude these experts' opinions under Fed. R. Evid. 702, 
703, and 403. On the same grounds, the defendants also 
filed motions in limine to preclude the plaintiffs' experts 
from testifying about evidence concerning the harm of 
dioxins and furans (chemicals sometimes present in 
transformer fluids), and evidence concerning the "Yusho" 
incident in Japan and the "Yu Cheng" incident in Taiwan, 
in which many individuals suffered adverse effects after 
consuming rice oil contaminated with PCBs and furans. 
Defendants also moved for summary judgment on all of 
plaintiffs' claims. 
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After holding five days of in limine hearings, in which Drs. 
Kopstein, Nisbet, and Sherman testified for the plaintiffs 
and ten scientists testified for the defendants, the district 
court entered orders excluding the opinions of all but one 
of the plaintiffs' experts. The court also excluded under 
Rule 403 evidence concerning dioxins and furans, and the 
Yusho and Yu Cheng incidents. The court then granted 
summary judgment against the plaintiffs on both their 
personal injury and medical monitoring claims on the 
grounds that they had adduced no evidence of exposure to 
the PCBs, or of causation. The district court also granted 
summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs' 
property damage claims on the grounds that plaintiffs could 
not prove that they had suffered permanent property 
damage in light of the EPA's proposed cleanup plan. 
 
In Paoli II, we affirmed most aspects of the judgment, but 
we also reversed in part and remanded for further 
proceedings. In reviewing the admissibility of expert 
opinions, we applied the admissibility standards enunciated 
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 
2768 (1993), which the Supreme Court decided after the 
district court's rulings. We held that, as to all but two of 
the plaintiffs, the court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding the testimony of plaintiffs' experts that PCBs had 
caused their (alleged) injuries. We reversed the district 
court's exclusion from evidence of Dr. Sherman's opinion 
with respect to the causation of injuries to Bessie 
Cunningham and Amber Burrell, two plaintiffs whom she 
actually examined and whose medical histories she took. 35 
F.3d at 765-70. We also affirmed the district court's 
exclusion of expert opinion concerning the effect of dioxins 
and furans and testimony related to the Yusho and Yu 
Cheng incidents. We further held that, in the absence of Dr. 
Sherman's opinion on causation, the district court had 
properly granted summary judgment for defendants with 
respect to the personal injury claims of 31 of 33 plaintiffs 
(excluding Bessie Cunningham and Amber Burrell, leaving 
their tort claims for trial). Id. at 770-71. 
 
We also held that the district court had erred in 
excluding as unreliable the opinions of experts who testified 
that plaintiffs needed medical monitoring as a result of 
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their alleged exposure to PCBs. Id. at 789-91. Those 
opinions, we noted, were "not seriously challenged" by 
defendants in the in limine hearing, and passed Daubert 
muster. Id. at 795. Accordingly, we reversed the grant of 
summary judgment on the medical monitoring claims. Id. 
 
Finally, we reversed the grant of summary judgment for 
the defendants with respect to plaintiffs' claim for 
diminution of property value. We predicted that 
Pennsylvania would allow recovery where the property 
sustains at least temporary physical damage, repairs will 
not restore the value of the property to the prior level, and 
there is some ongoing risk to land. In sum, the following 
claims remained in the litigation after Paoli II: the medical 
monitoring claims of 26 plaintiffs; the personal injury 
claims of two plaintiffs; and the property damage claims of 
ten plaintiffs.4 
 
Following Paoli II, and exercising its discretion under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), the district court 
ordered that the trial would proceed in two phases. Phase 
I would involve the "issues of exposure, causation, medical 
monitoring, and property damages." If a jury returned a 
verdict favorable to the plaintiffs, Phase II would determine 
the defendants' liability for all claims, and the amount, if 
any, of punitive damages. 
 
Prior to trial, defendants had moved in limine to exclude 
all the plaintiffs' evidence pertaining to heat-degraded PCBs 
and the heating process that produced them on the 
grounds: (1) that the evidence was covered by the court's 
prior order excluding evidence of dioxins and furans, which 
this Court affirmed in Paoli II; and (2) that, at all events, 
the evidence presented the same Rule 403 problems as had 
evidence of dioxins and furans. The court heard argument 
on the motion but reserved judgment until trial. During the 
course of testimony, plaintiffs proffered evidence on three 
separate occasions related to heat-degraded PCBs, which 
they alleged to be more toxic than "new PCBs" that had not 
been heated. In each instance, defendants challenged the 
evidence on the same grounds that they had advanced at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. During the subsequent trial, the district court granted the motion for 
voluntary dismissal of the tenth property damage claim. 
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the in limine hearing. In each instance, the court agreed 
with the defendants and ordered plaintiffs to refrain from 
referring to "heating" or heat-degraded PCBs. 
 
After thirteen days of Phase I testimony, consisting 
primarily of expert opinion, the jury returned a verdict for 
defendants on all claims. In response to special 
interrogatories, the jury found that none of the plaintiffs 
had been "significantly exposed" to PCBs from the Yard; 
that plaintiffs Bessie Cunningham and Amber Burrell had 
not sustained injuries as a result of PCB exposure; and 
that PCBs from the Yard had not damaged the plaintiffs' 
properties. Phase II therefore never took place. This appeal 
followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The plaintiffs contend that the district court's bifurcation of the trial 
violated their right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the Seventh 
Amendment because the jury would have to make foreseeability 
determinations when considering the causation issues of Phase I, 
whereas a different jury would have to make the same determinations 
when considering the negligence issues of Phase II. The record before us 
does not suggest that the district court actually considered summoning 
a different jury to hear the trial of Phase II, should Phase II have been 
necessary, and we fail to see why it would have. Moreover, the jury 
found for the defendants on all counts in Phase I, and because we will 
affirm the district court here, a second jury will not be convened. Under 
these circumstances, the issue would appear to be moot. At all events, 
the district court acted within its discretion when it ordered the 
bifurcation of the suit. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) authorizes district courts to bifurcate lawsuits 
into separate trials "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice," 
or when separate trials "will be conducive to expedition and economy." 
9 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 2387 (1995). Severance of the question of 
liability from other issues can "reduce the length of trial, particularly if 
the severed issue[s] [are] dispositive of the case, and can also improve 
comprehension of the issues and evidence." Manual for Complex 
Litigation, Third § 21.632, at 119 (West 1995). In the case at bar, the 
interests of judicial economy and convenience counseled strongly in 
favor of severing the issues relating to plaintiffs' exposure to PCBs and 
causation of their injuries from the issues of defendants' culpability. 
Phase I focused on plaintiffs' exposure to PCBs while Phase II would 
have concerned whether the conduct of several railroad operators and 
manufacturers caused that exposure. The trial of the Phase I issues 
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Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides in pertinent part that 
"[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
alone lasted three weeks and involved dozens of witnesses. Resolution of 
the Phase I issues obviated the need for a trial on the issues of the 
defendants' liability, which undoubtedly would have taken months and 
would have involved issues more complicated than the Phase I trial, all 
at additional cost to the parties. Thus, bifurcation preserved judicial 
resources and reduced the expenses of the parties, and the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in ordering such a process. See In re 
Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 309-314 (6th Cir. 1988) (issues of 
causation tried separately from issues of defendant's tortious conduct); 
In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 216-17 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(upholding severance of liability issues from causation issues). 
 
Even if a second trial on the liability issues had been conducted before 
a different jury, the district court's bifurcation of the case would not 
appear to have offended the Seventh Amendment. The Seventh 
Amendment requires that, when a court bifurcates a case, it must 
"divide issues between separate trials in such a way that the same issue 
is not reexamined by different juries." In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc 
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 L.Ed.2d 122 
(1995); McDaniel v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 987 F.2d 298, 304-05 (5th Cir. 
1993)("the Seventh Amendment guarantee of a trial by the jury is the 
general right of a litigant to have only one jury pass on a common issue 
of fact") (citations omitted). Plaintiffs argue that both Phase I causation 
issues and Phase II negligence issues would require the jury to make 
foreseeability determinations. We disagree. The first jury did not 
determine the foreseeability of plaintiffs' alleged or prospective injuries, 
and instead determined only whether the plaintiffs were exposed to PCBs 
and injured from that exposure. The district court did not instruct the 
jury on foreseeability, neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants requested 
an instruction on that issue, and the jury interrogatories did not refer to 
the foreseeability of the alleged harms. Nor does the fact that certain 
evidentiary items might have been relevant to both phases of trial require 
us to reverse the district court on this point, for the Seventh Amendment 
"prohibition is not against having two juries review the same evidence, 
but rather against having two juries decide the same essential issues." 
In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 
                                18 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." In making a 
Rule 403 determination, the court must balance the 
genuine need for the challenged evidence against the risk 
that the information will confuse the jury and delay trial. 
United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 747-48 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
A district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 749. A 
ruling excluding evidence under Rule 403 is accorded 
particular deference, and, provided that the court has 
explained its ruling or the reasons for its ruling are 
"otherwise apparent from the record," United States v. 
Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 318 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United 
States v. Himmelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 781 (3d Cir. 1994)), it 
may not be reversed unless the determination is "arbitrary 
and irrational." Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 
F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. DePeri, 
778 F.2d 963, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1985)); United States v. Long, 
574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir. 1978) ("If judicial self-restraint 
is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial 




During the in limine process following the initial remand 
(Paoli II), plaintiffs proffered evidence about dioxins and 
furans, which they contend could have been produced at 
the Yard when PCB-containing transformer fluids were 
heated, and also evidence of the Yusho and Yu Cheng 
poisoning incidents in which furans may have caused 
injuries. Acting on defendants' motion, the district court 
excluded all evidence concerning these chemicals as 
irrelevant under Rule 401 and unduly confusing and 
prejudicial under Rule 403. Specifically, the district court 
noted that the evidence would require defendants to 
"defend against a substance to which the Plaintiffs cannot 
prove they were exposed; confuse and complicate the issues 
for trial ..., confuse and mislead the jury ..., result in undue 
delay and wasting of time consumed in the presentation of 
irrelevant evidence at trial; and prejudice the Defendants by 
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permitting inflammatory evidence concerning substances 
such as dioxin as to which there is much public sensitivity 
and fear." 
 
In Paoli II, we affirmed the district court's rulings. 
Although we found that the district court had 
impermissibly excluded the evidence as irrelevant under the 
lenient standard of Rule 401, we ruled that the court had 
not abused its discretion in ruling the evidence 
inadmissible under Rule 403. 35 F.3d at 781-84. In so 
holding, we took cognizance of the fact that there was 
evidence in the record that various heat-producing activities 
occurred at the Yard, and that dioxins and furans may 
have been produced as a result. However, we agreed with 
the district court that, in light of the paucity of the evidence 
that plaintiffs were exposed to dioxins and furans, 
admitting evidence about those chemicals would have 
required time-consuming mini-trials on the minimally 
relevant issues of plaintiffs' alleged exposure to the 
chemicals and the effects of that exposure. Id. at 783. We 
also noted that furans and dioxins were alleged to be 
significantly more dangerous than PCBs and had received 
negative publicity, and therefore "would have been too 
inflammatory for the jury," given their minimal relevance. 
Id. 
 
Notwithstanding our affirmance of the district court's 
prior orders, plaintiffs sought on remand to proffer evidence 
of heat-degraded PCBs. Prior to trial, the district court 
heard argument from plaintiff regarding heat-degraded 
PCBs, but postponed judgment on admissibility. Plaintiffs 
attempted to proffer evidence about heat-degraded PCBs 
several times during trial. First, the plaintiffs' engineering 
expert testified that fires at the Yard created"chemicals ... 
present in heat degraded PCB transformer oils." The 
defendants objected that the testimony was an 
impermissible allusion to dioxins and furans, and the 
district court sustained the objection. Plaintiffs made no 
proffer as to what additional testimony the witness would 
have given on the subject. 
 
The issue arose a second time before the direct 
examination of plaintiffs' expert Dr. Nisbet. After the district 
court ruled that Dr. Nisbet could testify about increases in 
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toxicity caused by the "weathering" of PCBs in the 
environment, plaintiffs requested that Dr. Nisbet be 
permitted to testify that "over-heated transformer fluid" 
existed in the dirt at the Yard. Defendants objected that the 
only significance of the overheating of PCB fluid would be 
the generation of dioxins and furans. Plaintiffs' only 
response was that "[t]here will be no mention of furans, no 
mention of dioxins." The court then instructed the plaintiffs 
not to "refer to heating." Plaintiffs did not represent what 
Dr. Nisbet would have said about heated PCB fluid, except 
that it was present in the dirt at the Yard. 
 
The third episode arose after defendants questioned 
plaintiffs' expert Dr. Calesnick about the conclusion 
contained in Dr. Nicholson's meta-analysis, which analyzed 
deaths among PCB-exposed workers, that PCBs "pose 
minimal harm to health." Plaintiffs requested that the jury 
be read another sentence from the same analysis stating 
that PCBs "may be contaminated with more toxic 
polychlorinated hydrocarbons (e.g. polychlorinated 
dibenzofurans, PCDFs)," a passage that plaintiffs imply 
pertained to heat-degraded PCBs. The district court 
sustained defendants' objection to the evidence on the 
ground that the proffered text referred to contaminants 
previously excluded by the court.6 
 
Plaintiffs argue that the district court incorrectly 
interpreted its previous order regarding furans and dioxins, 
affirmed by this Court in Paoli II, as mandating the 
exclusion of evidence pertaining to heat-degraded PCBs. 
According to the plaintiffs, although heat-degraded PCBs 
are of the same toxicity as dioxins and furans, they are 
chemically distinct and remain part of the PCB family. 
Furthermore, they contend that in order to explain the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Plaintiffs contend that the "rule of completeness" embodied in Fed. R. 
Evid. 106 compelled admission of the additional portion of the text. Rule 
106 requires admission of those portions of writing that "ought in 
fairness to be considered." See United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 91 
(3d cir. 1984). But the very premise of the district court's determination 
to exclude evidence of furans was that plaintiffs' case regarding the 
alleged toxicity of PCBs could fairly proceed without evidence relating to 
furans. As a result, Rule 106 did not independently require the 
admission of additional portions of the text. 
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toxicity of heat-degraded PCBs they would not have needed 
to refer in any way to dioxins and furans, and hence that 
the admission of such evidence would not constitute an end 
run around the court's previous ruling. 
 
Plaintiffs further assert that the court's allegedly 
improper evidentiary rulings significantly impaired their 
ability to fully identify the substances to which they were 
allegedly exposed, thereby undermining the pursuit of both 
their medical monitoring and tort recovery. 
 
As we have seen, with regard to their medical monitoring 
claims, the plaintiffs failed to convince the jury that they 
were "significantly exposed to PCBs." Plaintiffs assert, 
however, that because heat-degraded PCBs have far greater 
carcinogenic potential than unheated PCB mixtures, had 
they been allowed to proffer the disputed evidence, they 
could have demonstrated that they were exposed to a kind 
of PCBs in an amount significant enough to warrant 
medical monitoring. Plaintiffs also submit that the 
defendants' experts, who testified that PCBs were not 
dangerous, relied largely on epidemiological studies of 
unheated, new PCB mixtures, rather than the heat- 
degraded PCBs to which plaintiffs allegedly were exposed, 
which again limited their ability to demonstrate "significant 
exposure." 
 
Additionally, plaintiffs argue that the court's evidentiary 
decisions impaired their ability to accurately present their 
property damage claims. In order to recover for property 
damage, the plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the remedial 
activities ordered by the EPA's ROD would not return the 
property to its former value. Plaintiffs contend that heat- 
degraded PCBs do not dissipate as rapidly as new PCBs, 
and, that had they been permitted to offer evidence of heat- 
degraded PCBs, they could have demonstrated that the 
remediation ordered by the EPA would be insufficient to 
neutralize the presence of heat-degraded PCBs at the Yard, 
and that property damages were in order. As a result, 
plaintiffs suggest that the court's alleged errors were not 
harmless and provide a sound basis for reversal. 
 
The defendants respond that heat-degraded PCBs are 
merely furans by another name, and that therefore the 
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exclusion of evidence of heat-degraded PCBs was entirely 
within the ambit of the court's prior ruling regarding 
furans. Defendants further argue that the admission of 
such evidence would have posed its own Rule 403 dangers 




As an initial matter, we are satisfied that the plaintiffs 
had ample opportunity to convince the jury that they were 
exposed to PCBs of a more toxic variety than the 
"background" PCBs that they normally would have 
encountered in day-to-day life. Plaintiffs presented evidence 
that they were exposed to Aroclor 1260 PCBs and to 
weathered Aroclor 1260. According to the plaintiffs' 
evidence, the harmfulness of a PCB mixture is a function of 
its persistence: those PCBs that are the most difficult to 
eliminate from our bodies and environment pose the 
greatest potential danger. PCB mixtures, the plaintiffs 
allege, are particularly persistent if they are manufactured 
with a high degree of chlorination or with a high number of 
coplanar congeners. Plaintiffs proffered evidence that 
Aroclor 1260 compounds, even when new, contain the 
highest chlorine content of any PCB mixture commonly 
used in this country. The chlorine content of a mixture may 
also increase as a result of weathering, which is a process 
of selective retention or preferential bioaccumulation. In 
addition, coplanar congeners may be formed through 
incineration. Thus, plaintiffs argue, the chemical to which 
they were exposed was more toxic than other PCB 
mixtures. 
 
Not only did the plaintiffs have the opportunity to 
introduce evidence that they were exposed to PCBs of a 
more toxic variety than the background PCBs that they 
normally would have encountered, but we are also satisfied 
that the evidence they were prevented from introducing 
would not have substantially altered their case, because 
they had the opportunity to put forward at trial their 
essential theory -- that the PCBs to which they were 
exposed were more toxic than the PCBs in the 
epidemiological literature. In this vein, Dr. Nisbet testified 
that the estimates in defendants' tables, which were 
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proffered as proof that PCBs were not toxic, were based on 
analysis of PCBs of "a potency factor ... for the 
unweathered, the pure unweathered aroclors," while the 
scientific evidence regarding weathered PCBs "would 
[probably] be more hazardous." Thus, plaintiffs were able to 
present and reemphasize the theme of their argument -- 
that what they were exposed to was somehow more 
dangerous than that to which the background population 
was exposed. They therefore had little genuine need for the 
excluded evidence. 
 
At all events, we are persuaded by the defendants' 
arguments and our independent analysis that the district 
court acted within its discretion when it excluded plaintiffs' 
evidence of heat-degraded PCBs. In a ruling affirmed by 
this Court, the district court had previously excluded 
evidence of dioxins and furans, and plaintiffs' proffer of 
evidence of heat-degraded PCBs appears to have been an 
attempt to evade that ruling by altering the vocabulary. The 
only proffered basis for admission that plaintiffs offered the 
court during trial was that the witnesses would not utter 
the words "dioxin" or "furan." But this justification reads 
the affirmed prior order, which excluded "[a]ll Testimony, 
Evidence or Statements to the Jury ... concerning Dioxins, 
Furans, Tin Tetraphenyl, and Epoxides," too narrowly, for 
the district court had excluded all evidence that concerns 
the offending chemicals. 
 
The district court was not without basis for believing that 
heat-degraded PCBs are functionally dioxins by another 
name. For example, according to plaintiffs, heat-degraded 
PCBs have the same toxicity as dioxins. See Appellants' 
Reply Brief at 5. Additionally, in their deposition testimony, 
plaintiffs' experts treated heat-degraded PCBs as 
toxicologically equivalent to dioxins. For instance, Dr. 
Sherman testified that the literature on coplanar PCBs 
"likens them to the para dioxins." In addition, the record 
suggests that heat-degraded PCBs, like dioxins and furans, 
are waste products formed by the incineration of new PCBs. 
 
Moreover, at oral argument before us, plaintiffs' counsel 
explained that heat-degraded PCBs are refered to as 
"dioxin-like" because they react to the same AH receptor 
that is exploited by dioxin molecules. Discussion of the 
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toxicity of coplanar PCBs at trial would thus likely have 
reintroduced the subject of dioxins in a slightly different 
guise. In sum, it appears to us that the district court did 
not err in concluding that the plaintiffs' proffer, which was 
weakly made, was within the ambit of the court's prior 




Finally, even if the evidence about heat-degraded PCBs 
was not precluded by the literal terms of the prior ruling, 
we are persuaded by the defendants' arguments that the 
district court was within its discretion to make an 
independent ruling under Rule 403 excluding evidence of 
heat-degraded PCBs on the ground that its probative value 
was substantially outweighed by its tendency to cause 
delay, confusion, and unfair prejudice.8  Such a ruling 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Our ruling does not emanate from any pretense of scientific 
exactitude, and, unfortunately, the materials presented to this Court fail 
to illuminate how dioxins and furans differ from heat-degraded PCBs, if 
in fact they do. Plaintiffs' briefs instead focus on the differences between 
heat-degraded and unheat-degraded PCBs, and thus offer little guidance 
as to the scope of the prior ruling. So then, despite the similarities 
between dioxins and heat-degraded PCBs, subtle structural differences 
may in fact exist so that it is possible that evidence of heat-degraded 
PCBs may fall outside the scope of the court's prior ruling regarding 
dioxins and furans. In fact, one comment made by defense counsel 
seems to admit of the possibility that heat-degraded PCBs differ 
materially from dioxins and furans. See Brief for Appellees General 
Electric Co., Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the 
City of Philadelphia, and Westinghouse Corp., at 14 ("evidence about 
coplanar congeners was not precluded by the literal terms of the court's 
prior rulings"). These possibilities, however, cannot control our 
evidentiary ruling in view of the weakness of the plaintiffs' showing. 
Thus, because of the similarities between dioxins and heat-degraded 
PCBs mentioned above, we remain convinced that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in considering evidence of heat-degraded PCBs 
to be within the ambit of its previous ruling. 
 
8. While we normally require a district court to make explicit its 
reasoning under Rule 403, this is an unusual situation. The district 
court did not make an explicit Rule 403 balancing because it believed 
that the challenged evidence was properly excluded under its affirmed 
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would find precedent in our initial ruling on the general 
subject, wherein we adverted to the necessity of mini-trials 
on the issues presented by the effort to demonstrate 
exposure to and the impact of heat-degraded PCBs. See 
Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 781-84. 
 
First, there is little evidence that plaintiffs' exposure to 
heat-degraded PCBs was significant. There was no offer of 
proof at trial that heat-degraded PCBs were found at the 
Yard or in the soil of the nearby residences, or that the 
temperatures to which PCB fluids were subjected at the 
Yard were sufficient to create those types of congeners. In 
fact, a significant amount of soil sampling data failed to 
indicate that heat-degraded PCBs, as distinct from new 
PCBs, existed in the soil. In addition, the evidence at trial 
allowed the conclusion that plaintiffs had not sustained 
any abnormal exposure to PCBs, regardless of whether that 
exposure was with respect to heated or unheat-degraded 
PCBs.9 
 
Moreover, the evidence that the plaintiffs allege was 
impermissibly excluded from trial -- evidence of significant 
exposure to heat-degraded PCBs -- was never proffered, 
and apparently was never adequately developed; thus, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
prior order. For purposes of this appeal, we therefore regard the required 
403 balancing as implicit in the court's ruling. See Sheridan v. E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1076 n.10 (3d Cir. 1996). 
In taking this action, we in no way suggest that the district courts are 
relieved from their obligation to perform this weighing process on the 
record. Although we are able to perform this balancing test here, other 
cases may require remand to the court or even a new trial. See Sriyuth, 
98 F.3d at 744 n.8 ("We take this occasion, once again, to remind the 
district courts of their obligation to perform this weighing process on the 
record."). 
 
9. All but one of the plaintiffs had their blood analyzed for PCB content. 
Five were found to have no detectable levels of PCBs in their blood. The 
highest level found among the others was 30 ppb in one plaintiff, a level 
that the laboratory conducting the analysis considered to be within the 
normal reference range for PCBs in human blood. In contrast, workers 
involved in the manufacturing of PCB-containing electrical equipment 
have been found to have blood levels averaging close to 400 ppb and 
measuring as high as 3500 ppb. (A2999). 
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district court never had the opportunity to exclude it. Oral 
argument on the present appeal was the first time that 
plaintiffs' counsel recounted how the plaintiffs would have 
proven that they were exposed to heat-degraded PCBs: they 
intended to compare chromatograms, which measure the 
concentration of PCBs, of the soil used at the Yard to a 
chromatogram of new, unheat-degraded PCBs. They then 
would have compared the chromatograms of the PCBs at 
the Yard to the chromatograms of the chemical remnants 
found in plaintiffs' blood. The nature of the PCB mixture 
found in a blood sample is determined by the "peaks" in a 
given chromatogram. If given the opportunity, plaintiffs 
contend that Dr. Nisbet would have testified that the 
chromatograms of plaintiffs' blood, which were proffered at 
trial, recorded peaks attributable to heat-degraded mixtures 
of Aroclor 1260 PCBs. 
 
While oral argument provided new explanations of the 
probative value of what plaintiffs intended to show at trial, 
and the evidence that they claim they would have 
introduced appears to differ from the evidence actually 
admitted at trial, we are not at liberty to consider it. 
Instead, we are limited to a review of the record that was 
before the district court, and, as previously mentioned, the 
evidence actually before the district court did not suggest a 
difference in the type of PCBs measured in the plaintiffs' 
blood. As such, we find persuasive defendants' contentions 
that plaintiffs were little prejudiced by the exclusion of 
evidence pertaining to heat-degraded PCBs and that such 
evidence was of minor probative value. 
 
Finally, admitting evidence regarding heat-degraded PCBs 
would appear to require extensive mini-trials on plaintiffs' 
exposure to these chemicals and the harm they cause. 
Given the small probative value of the evidence, such a 
diversion would constitute "undue delay." In sum, under 
Fed. R. Evid. 403, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding the evidence concerning heat- 
degraded PCBs. 
 
III. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
 
We turn to plaintiffs' challenge to the jury instructions 
regarding the medical monitoring and property damage 
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claims. Generally we review a district court's jury 
instructions for abuse of discretion, although whether the 
jury instructions misstate a legal standard is a question 
over which we have plenary review. See United States v. 
Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1995). We review the 
charge to ensure that "the charge, taken as a whole and 
viewed in the light of the evidence, fairly and adequately 
submits the issues in the case to the jury." In re Merritt 
Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting 
Ayoub v. Spencer, 550 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 1977). In 
evaluating whether the district court satisfied this 
requirement, we must examine the charge in its entirety 
and not limit ourselves to particular phrases in isolation. 
See Coyle, 63 F.3d at 1245. 
 
A. The Medical Monitoring Claim Instructions 
 
The jury rejected the plaintiffs' medical monitoring 
claims, and plaintiffs now contend that the district court 
erred when it instructed the jury that, in order tofind for 
plaintiffs, they must conclude that the plaintiffs had been 
exposed to a greater level of PCBs as a result of the 
activities at the Yard than they would encounter normally 
in their day-to-day lives. In order to evaluate this 
contention, we must first provide some context. In Paoli I, 
916 F.2d at 852, this Court addressed the predicament of 
persons who are exposed to toxic chemicals but do not 
suffer from manifest physical injuries. We noted that when 
these persons suffer instead from latent injuries, common 
law tort doctrine has often barred recovery because, 
traditionally, "injury needed to be manifest before it could 
be compensable," and toxic torts often fail to conform "with 
the common law conception of injury." Id. at 850. In an 
effort to accommodate the potential injuries associated with 
the widespread use of toxic substances, we predicted that 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would recognize medical 
monitoring claims by plaintiffs who have been exposed to 
toxic substances but have not suffered manifest physical 
injuries, and would authorize a plaintiff to recover the 
"quantifiable costs of periodic medical examinations 
necessary to detect the onset of physical harm." Id. at 852. 
We noted that medical monitoring and traditional tort 
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claims are inherently distinct causes of action, and that, 
once an injury is manifest and detected, a plaintiff who has 
pursued a medical monitoring claim may also have a 
traditional tort action against the same defendant for the 




In Paoli I, we also set forth the elements we understand 
to be necessary to a successful medical monitoring claim 
under Pennsylvania law: 
 
1. Plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven 
hazardous substance through the negligent actions of 
the defendants. 
 
2. As a proximate result of exposure, plaintiff suffers 
a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious 
latent disease. 
 
3. The increased risk makes periodic examinations 
reasonably necessary. 
 
4. Monitoring and testing procedures exist which 
make the early detection and treatment of the disease 
possible and beneficial. 
 
Id. at 852. 
 
The first hurdle for a plaintiff pursuing of a medical 
monitoring claim is the need to demonstrate "significant 
exposure" to a proven hazardous substance. In the case at 
bar, the jury determined that the plaintiffs had not been 
significantly exposed to PCBs, and therefore could not 
satisfy even the first of the four factors necessary to a 
successful claim. As a result, we need only concern 
ourselves here with the jury charge as it relates to the 




The district court initially instructed the jury on the 
"significant exposure" element as follows: 
 
Each plaintiff must prove through competent expert 
testimony that he or she was significantly exposed to 
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PCBs from the Paoli Railyard. The plaintiff must prove 
that PCBs from the Paoli Yard actually entered his or 
her body in amounts significantly beyond what would 
enter a person's body in everyday life elsewhere in the 
Philadelphia area and in amounts sufficient to cause 
the plaintiff to have a risk of future disease 
significantly greater than what he or she would have 
had without exposure. 
 
After plaintiff objected to this formulation, the court further 
instructed the jury that "the amount of PCBs that anyone 
would be exposed to in the Philadelphia area, simply means 
... greater than [the] normal background area in this 
region." 
 
The following day, in response to a question for 
clarification from the deliberating jury regarding the 
personal injury claims, the court again instructed the jury: 
 
Exposure to PCBs i[s] sufficient if it causes 
significantly increased risk of contracting a serious 
latent disease.... I instructed you that [plaintiffs] had to 
show that amounts were significantly beyond what 
ordinarily entered a person's body in every day life, 
elsewhere in the Philadelphia area. 
 
And again, those -- the testimony with respect to the 
exposure in this area of PCBs to everyone, is just one 
factor to be considered in determining whether or not 
they were significantly exposed to PCBs from the Paoli 
Yard. So you would consider all of those circumstances 
in considering whether or not they were exposed. 
 
Plaintiffs challenge the instruction that a showing of 
"significant exposure" required proof that they had been 
exposed to levels of PCBs greater than the normal 
background levels. But that part of the court's instruction 
was taken almost verbatim from Redland Soccer Club v. 
Department of Navy, 55 F.3d 827 (3d Cir. 1995), where we 
defined the term "significant exposure" to require that: 
 
a plaintiff ... prove that he was exposed beyond what 
would normally be encountered by a person in everyday 
life, so that the plaintiff's risk of being injured from the 
exposure is greater, in some way, than the risks all of 
us encounter in our everyday lives. ... 
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Thus Paoli II requires plaintiffs to show not only that 
their exposure to toxic substances is greater than 
normal background levels, but that the increased risk 
of injury from such exposure warrants medical 
monitoring against future illness beyond that which is 
recommended for everyone. 
 
Id. at 846 & n.8 (emphasis added). In other words, medical 
monitoring claimants must "show[ ] they were exposed to 
the toxins at issue at levels significantly above their normal 
background presence." Id. at 847. The court's instructions 
fairly and adequately set forth the "significant exposure" 
element as articulated in Redland Soccer. In fact, we 
perceive no discernable difference between Redland Soccer 
and the jury charge issued here in terms of the applicable 
standard; to that extent, plaintiffs' position appears to be a 
remonstrance against Redland Soccer, which the district 
court was constrained to follow (as are we, see Third Circuit 
Internal Operating Procedures § 9.1). 
 
We also find persuasive the argument set forth by 
counsel for the defendants that, if anything, the district 
court's charge suggested that plaintiffs' burden of proof on 
this element was lighter than that mandated by Redland 
Soccer. The court responded to the jury's request for 
clarification by modifying the previous day's charge and 
stating that whether plaintiffs' exposure was above the 
background level was "just one factor" in determining 
significant exposure. However, Redland Soccer makes clear 
that the existence of above-background-level exposure is 
not merely "one factor" in determining the significance of 
the exposure. Instead, proof of abnormal exposure is an 




Faced with the foregoing analysis, plaintiffs invoke a 
footnote in Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 771 n.36, under which they 
contend that they could make out a viable medical 
monitoring claim "even if their exposure was within 
background levels," so long as the exposure stemmed from 
defendants' PCBs and "was sufficient to result in their 
illnesses." The footnote reads: 
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We note that even if defendants are correct that 
plaintiffs can only demonstrate exposure at levels 
within background, this would not necessarily justify 
the grant of summary judgment for defendants. For 
example, if everyone in the population had been 
exposed to substantial amounts of defendants' PCBs 
such that each individual had high PCB levels, each 
individual would have PCB levels within the 
background but this would not justify a verdict for 
defendants. Normally, plaintiffs could not make out a 
viable claim if their exposure is within background 
levels because there would be no reason to believe that 
their exposure was from the defendants' PCBs as 
opposed to other PCBs. However, to the extent that the 
plaintiffs can demonstrate that their exposure stemmed 
from the defendants' PCBs, they will have presented 
evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment even 
if their exposure was within background levels--so long 




10. As we have noted above, plaintiffs submit that they were exposed to 
a more toxic type of PCB -- heat-degraded mixtures -- than they would 
have ordinarily encountered in their day-to-day existence, and that, even 
if they were not exposed to a greater quantity of PCBs than they 
ordinarily would have encountered, they were exposed to a risk of injury 
significant enough to warrant medical monitoring. Plaintiffs contend that 
Redland Soccer does not counsel otherwise, for in defining "significant 
exposure," Redland Soccer did not require the jury to make amount- 
based comparisons of exposure to contaminants, but only to compare 
the nature and extent of the risk incurred through exposure. Thus, their 
argument continues, the court incorrectly required the jury to find that 
plaintiffs had been exposed to PCBs in an amount greater than that 
found in the Philadelphia area. 
 
It is not inconceivable that a situation may arise in which the form of 
a contaminant is so toxic that exposure to it merits medical monitoring, 
even if the exposed plaintiffs ordinarily encounter similar amounts of a 
less toxic form of the same contaminant. But such is not the case here, 
at least under the record, which is poorly developed in this regard. The 
evidence is unclear as to whether the greater toxicity of the heat- 
degraded PCBs stems from its persistence in the soil, so that a plaintiff's 
exposure is simply of longer duration, or if it results in greater bodily 
impact. Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Nisbet testified that "in the process of 
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Id. 
 
According to plaintiffs', this footnote allows them to 
pursue a medical monitoring claim so long as they proffer 
evidence that they were exposed to sufficient levels of 
defendants' PCBs to result in their illnesses, a proffer which 
they claim to have made. Plaintiffs note that they offered 
expert and lay testimony explaining that their PCB 
exposure stemmed from the defendants' PCBs. Moreover, 
they offered proof, to the extent allowed by the district 
court, that the PCBs to which they were exposed were more 
dangerous than those PCBs to which the population as a 
whole was exposed.11 As a result, plaintiffs argue, the 
district court improperly instructed the jury that, in order 
to constitute "significant exposure," the plaintiffs must have 
been exposed to a greater amount of PCBs than the 
population as a whole. 
 
Plaintiffs' reliance on the Paoli II footnote is misplaced.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
weathering the most toxic, the most hazardous components ... are 
preferentially retained, so that PCB mixtures become more hazardous as 
they move through the environment." But the testimony is susceptible to 
two different explanations. Of course, if the increased toxicity results in 
longer exposure, blood level measures already in the record would take 
account of it. If it results in greater bodily impact, the record evidence is 
insufficient to give the jury guidance to support an award based on that 
theory. In sum, although in another situation plaintiffs may be correct 
that a pure focus on amount of exposure may be a mistake, plaintiffs' 
argument falls short on the record. 
 
11. At oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel suggested that it was possible to 
discern from chromatograms whether the PCBs in the soil and plaintiffs' 
blood were remnants of heat-degraded PCBs or new PCBs. Yet plaintiffs 
have never compared the level of heat-degraded PCBs resulting from the 
Yard to the level of heat-degraded PCBs that they normally encountered, 
which if greater would have conformed to the court's definition of 
"significant exposure." As such, the court did not err in charging the jury 
that they may consider as one factor whether plaintiffs were exposed to 
a quantitatively different level of PCBs than was the background 
population. 
 
12. Defendants attempt to reconcile Redland Soccer and Paoli II on the 
ground that note 36 of Paoli II relates only to the plaintiffs' personal 
injury claims and not their medical monitoring claims. However, the 
footnote did not limit itself to plaintiffs' personal injury claims, and the 
text to which it is appended applies to both personal injury and medical 
monitoring claims. 
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In Paoli II, the defendants moved for summary judgment as 
to both personal injury and medical monitoring claims on 
the grounds that plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that 
they were exposed to PCBs at levels above the background 
levels to which members of the general population were 
exposed. In a footnote intended to supply doctrinal context 
to its prediction of Pennsylvania law, the panel admitted of 
the possibility that in the limited situation where "everyone 
in the population had been exposed to substantial amounts 
of defendants' PCBs," plaintiffs could withstand summary 
judgment without demonstrating above-background levels 
of PCBs. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in the Paoli II footnote, 
we identified a potential limited exception to the general 
requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate above-background 
level exposure, an exception that ensures that the most 
egregious polluters, those who cause abnormally high 
degrees of contaminants to permeate an entire geographical 
area, do not escape medical monitoring liability by virtue of 
their own extraordinary malfeasance. The plaintiffs, 
however, offer no proof that the background area in which 
they live was generally exposed to a high level of 
defendants' contaminants or that the background PCB level 
in the Philadelphia area emanated from the Paoli Yard. As 
a result, they must satisfy the general requirement 
articulated in Redland Soccer of abnormal exposure to 
PCBs. 
 
Plaintiffs assert that Redland Soccer applies only where 
plaintiffs cannot demonstrate direct exposure to the 
defendants' toxic chemicals, and that in the case at bar, 
direct evidence of contamination was offered, so that the 
Paoli II footnote and not Redland Soccer provides the 
applicable legal standard. However, this characterization of 
the relationship between Paoli II and Redland Soccer misses 
the mark. First, as previously iterated, it is the Paoli II 
footnote, not Redland Soccer, that is limited to a particular 
context, namely abnormally extensive contamination by a 
defendant. Second, neither Redland Soccer nor the 
jurisprudence of medical monitoring claims makes a 
distinction between cases of direct and indirect exposure. 
See, e.g., Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 849-52; Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 
771-78; Redland Soccer, 55 F.3d at 846-47. Instead, 
plaintiffs must prove that their exposure to contaminants 
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exceeded that which they would normally encounter in 
their daily routines regardless of the nature of the evidence 
offered in proof. 
 
Redland Soccer recognizes that the medical monitoring 
cause of action calls for a legal standard different from that 
of traditional torts because of the special nature of the 
claim. As we previously noted, medical monitoring claims 
recognize a need for monitoring because of a significantly 
increased risk of contracting a disease. 55 F.3d at 846. The 
risk created by chemical exposure is not "significantly 
increased" unless it is greater than "the normal risks all of 
us encounter in our every day lives." Id. Only by requiring 
a plaintiff to show significant exposure in this way can a 
court ensure that the plaintiff suffers a need for medical 
monitoring that is greater than that required by all other 
persons. Id. If levels of exposure within background levels 
were enough to create an entitlement to medical 
monitoring, a toxic tort defendant "would become a health 
care insurer for medical procedures routinely needed to 
guard persons against some of the ordinary vicissitudes of 
life. It would convert toxic torts into a form of specialized 
health insurance." Id. at 846 n.8.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13.  Plaintiffs also challenge the district court's instruction that they had 
to prove their exposure was greater than the background level "in the 
Philadelphia area" or "in this region." But the references to the 
background level in the pertinent geographic area were entirely proper 
and necessary to give meaning to the principles set forth in Redland 
Soccer. 
 
We note in this regard that there was sharply conflicting testimony 
about the amount of background exposure to PCBs. Dr. Whysner 
testified for the defense that in the northeastern United States, including 
Pennsylvania, the background exposure is an amount sufficient to result 
in an average PCB level of 9.2 ppb in human blood. By contrast, 
plaintiffs' expert Dr. Nisbet opined that background exposure is an 
amount that results in a blood level of just 0.1 ppb. However, Dr. Nisbet 
derived that figure from a study of residents in rural South Carolina. He 
also acknowledged that background exposures tend to be higher in the 
northeast, including Pennsylvania, than in the country as a whole. 
 
Against this background, the district court was correct to instruct the 
jury that what mattered was the background level of exposure in the 
specific region in which the plaintiffs resided. To instruct otherwise 
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In sum, the district court acted within the ambit of its 
discretion when it instructed the jury that, in conformance 
with Redland Soccer and Paoli II, to be successful in their 
claim for medical monitoring, plaintiffs must demonstrate 
that they were exposed to a greater level of PCB exposure 
than they would ordinarily encounter in their daily life. 
 
B. The Property Damage Instructions 
 
Plaintiffs also contend that the district court improperly 
instructed the jurors with respect to their "stigma" property 
damage claims. The district court instructed the jury twice 
on plaintiffs' property damage claims. The court initially 
stated: 
 
In order to recover damages for the loss in market 
value of their properties, each plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence first that PCBs from the 
Paoli Railyard caused some actual physical damage to 
the plaintiff's property. Second, that the plaintiffs 
prove that repairing that damage will not restore the 
value of the property to the value it had prior to the 
damage. 
 
After the court's initial jury charge, the jurors asked 
whether stigma can be considered damage, "regardless of 
any physical damage to the property." The court responded 
in pertinent part: 
 
if you find that there was actual physical damage to 
the property, even if it was temporary, the plaintiffs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
would have rendered meaningless this Court's requirement that plaintiffs 
prove exposure beyond what would "normally be encountered by a 
person in everyday life," for the jury would have been allowed to use 
rural South Carolina or some other non-industrial region as its 
benchmark for the ordinary life of the residents surrounding the Paoli 
Railyard. Finally, and at all events, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate 
prejudice from that instruction because, as noted above, the court later 
diluted the charge to state that the background level was "just one 
factor" in determining significant exposure. See, e.g., United States v. 
Garrett, 574 F.2d 778, 782 (3d Cir. 1978) (other parts of a charge can 
cure even a constitutionally defective instruction). 
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would be entitled to recover for stigma damage. But 
there must first have been actual physical damage to 
the property in order to recover for stigma damage. 
 
Plaintiffs assert that, because the court repeatedly stated 
that the damage must be "actual," a term that plaintiffs 
contend means "permanent," it improperly failed to instruct 
the jurors that a stigma-based property damage claim may 
be based on temporary physical damage as authorized by 
Paoli II.14 
 
In Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 798, we ruled that an award of 
stigma damages requires proof of the following elements: 
"(1) defendants have caused some (temporary) physical 
damage to plaintiffs' property; (2) plaintiffs demonstrate 
that repair of this damage will not restore the value of the 
property to its prior level; and (3) plaintiffs show that there 
is some ongoing risk to their land." 
 
The plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in 
instructing the jury to consider whether "actual" property 
damage occurred under the Paoli II standard. However, as 
we stated above, what the court instructed the jury was 
that the plaintiffs need only demonstrate temporary 
physical damage; the court never instructed the jury that 
the damage had to be permanent. The court's repeated use 
of the word "actual" did not convey a different legal 
standard to the jury. The dictionary defines "actual" as 
"existing in reality or fact." Webster's New World Dictionary 
14 (3d College ed. 1988). Thus, actual damage can be either 
temporary or permanent. As a result, the jury was not 
improperly restricted to a finding of permanent damage as 
a prerequisite to a finding for the plaintiffs. Moreover, the 
court's use of the word "actual" was appropriate because 
Paoli II specifically requires proof of some real physical 
damage to plaintiffs' land, some damage that "exists in 




14. Plaintiffs complain that the court employed the term "actual" thirteen 
times during the course of instructing the jury on the property damage 
claim. Because we determine that the word "actual" correctly 
communicates the legal standard at issue, the frequency with which the 
court employed the term is irrelevant. 
 
                                37 
Moreover, plaintiffs never objected to the use of the word 
"actual" at trial, and have therefore waived their right to 
object. Neely v. Club Med Management Servs., Inc., 63 F.3d 
166, 200 (3d Cir. 1995) (objections to jury charge waived if 
not made before closing argument or the closing of 
charging); Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. A narrow exception to waiver 
exists where review is necessary to avoid a gross 
miscarriage of justice, Neely, 63 F.3d at 200 n.39, or if the 
error of the district court was plain, United States v. 
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1260 n.6 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1699 (1995). Because we conclude that 
the district court did not err in its instructions, we need not 
consider here the applicability of the exceptions to waiver, 
though we observe that making the exceptions applicable 
here would be quite a "stretch." 
 
Plaintiffs next contend that the district court improperly 
instructed the jurors to assume that the clean-up activities 
set forth in the EPA's 1992 ROD will be implemented, see 
supra n.3. The district court instructed the jurors: 
 
 If you find that plaintiffs' property suffered actual 
physical damage as a result of the presence of PCBs 
from the Paoli Yard, in order for [a] plaintiff to recover, 
you must also find that the repair of that damage will 
not restore the value of the property to the value that 
it had prior to the damage. 
 
 In other words, to be entitled to recover, each 
plaintiff must prove to you that the clean up activities 
mandated by the [EPA] will not eliminate the stigma or 
the loss in value associated with the presence of PCBs 
on his or her property. 
 
As of the time of oral argument, the clean-up activities 
ordered by the EPA some four years ago had not been 
implemented. As a result, plaintiffs contend, the jurors 
should not have been required to proceed on the basis that 
all of EPA's remedies would be implemented. At the very 
least, plaintiffs assign as error the court's failure to give 
them notice as to the challenged instruction so that they 
might have offered evidence that the defendants had 
successfully resisted implementation of EPA's orders. While 
we are sympathetic to the plaintiffs' position, it does not 
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provide grounds for reversal, for the district court's 
instructions were not in error. 
 
In Paoli II, we explained that, to recover for stigma 
property damages, plaintiffs must prove that "the stigma 
associated with their land will remain in place after any 
physical damage to their land has been repaired," 
regardless of whether the repair is actually completed. 35 
F.3d at 798, n.64. Thus, the district court's instruction to 
the jury to consider whether the plaintiffs' property would 
remain damaged after the EPA-mandated clean-up 
activities were completed followed from the nature of the 
plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs could have brought suit 
under different theories of recovery, such as for temporary 
loss of use during remediation, but they did not. See Dennis 
v. Ford Motor Co., 471 F.2d 733, 736-37 (3d Cir. 1973) 
(recognizing claim for loss of use of commercial vehicle 
under Pennsylvania law). They were in no way precluded 
from laying a foundation for such a claim, or offering 
factual evidence of whether the EPA clean-up will ever be 
completed. But they did not do so, and it is not for the 
district court to assume sua sponte the responsibility at the 
close of trial to present plaintiffs' best approach to an issue 
to the jury. 
 
Finally, plaintiffs note that three of the nine property 
damage claimants sold their properties at a loss, and 
contend therefore they could not benefit from the remedial 
activities mandated by the EPA, even if such activities are 
completed.15 As explained above, whether repairs are 
actually completed, and, whether they are completed prior 
to the sale of the properties in question, is legally irrelevant 
to the success of the claim that was tried -- one for stigma 
property damage. Plaintiffs were not precluded from 
presenting evidence that they suffered an interim loss in 
property value prior to the remediation. Instead, they tried 
to persuade the jury that they suffered permanent property 
damage, and the jury was not swayed. Thus, plaintiffs' 




15. Plaintiffs' expert Ludwig testified that the three plaintiffs who had 
sold their properties prior to trial lost $63,000, $55,000, and $15,000 
respectively. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
It is not without a backward glance that we finally lay 
this case to rest. Countless hours and immeasurable efforts 
have been dedicated to guaranteeing the plaintiffs proper 
pretrial proceedings and their fair day in court. Yet after 
two weeks of trial, the jury remained unconvinced of the 
most basic of plaintiffs' claims. While some may have found 
the verdict surprising, our analysis of the district court's 
proceedings has assured us that the verdict was not the 
result of reversible trial error. The judgment of the district 
court will therefore be affirmed. 
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